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Abstract 
Recent philosophical work on biological homology has generally treated its conceptual 
fragmentation as a problem to be solved by new accounts that either unify disparate 
approaches to homology or specify sharp constraints on its meaning. I show that several 
proposed solutions either misunderstand or ignore central features of comparative 
biological research, despite attempts to capture scientific practice. I conclude that the 
problem is incorrectly framed and that disagreements about homology may be 
epistemically fruitful. Empirically tractable debates are more likely to occur among 
biologists who share theoretical perspectives on homology. Philosophers should consider 
homology not merely as a generator of inductive generalizations but also as a scaffold for 
meaningful empirical comparisons.  
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1. Introduction 
“I will grant that someone might be able to generate an original thought concerning 
homology, but I doubt it.” So complained the herpetologist David Wake nearly twenty 
years ago, during a revival of biological interest in the topic. Wake certainly did not 
doubt the importance of homology—a slippery notion perhaps most neutrally defined as 
correspondence between the parts of different organisms (Brigandt 2012). On the 
contrary, Wake elsewhere proclaimed it to be “the central concept for all of biology” 
(1994, 268). Having established this bedrock position for homology, however, Wake 
thought that continued discussion of its meaning was a distraction from more interesting 
biological research questions. “Isn't it time to move on?” he asked (1999, 24). 
Wake’s caution notwithstanding, speculation about the meaning of homology has 
continued apace in both biological and philosophical circles. Philosophical attention to 
the topic has been influenced by the rising tide of interest in scientific practice. In the first 
few sections of this paper, I will briefly review and critique several philosophical 
analyses of homology that appeal to some aspect of scientists’ aims or methods. They 
exhibit two general approaches — some offer restrictive accounts of homology that 
deliberately exclude certain biological positions, while others offer compatibilist accounts 
that reconcile these positions. While the latter are more successful, both kinds of 
approach ultimately fail to capture important aspects of biological practice.  
Given the diversity of biological practice, the pervasiveness of homology, and the 
broad theoretical level at which different accounts are traditionally characterized, this 
failure is not surprising. In response, I suggest that philosophers need to reconsider 
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whether conflict between theoretical accounts of homology is really such a problem after 
all. Such conflict can coexist with broad agreement on the underlying methodological 
principles that support the reconstruction of evolutionary history. In contrast, biologists 
working within the same theoretical perspectives often pursue extended conflict about 
empirically tractable questions for which the data is still too limited, or interpretations 
still too underdetermined, to settle the matter. Homology is therefore just as much a tool 
for generating provocative comparisons as it is for supporting inductive generalizations 
based on natural kinds. 
 
2. Homologizing as Kinding 
Catherine Kendig (2016) offers a restrictive account of homology that is particularly 
emphatic about attending to practice. Her goal is to shift the focus of the debate away 
from “defining homology” to “the practices of homologizing” (106). She takes homology 
to be a natural kind concept, and homologizing to be a set of rule-following practices, or 
“kinding activities that have shaped, and continue to shape, the meaning and use of 
homology” (106–7). The first part of her paper analyzes the long history of comparative 
practices, from the comparative anatomical investigations of Vesalius and Belon, through 
Richard Owen’s attempts to reconcile Cuvier’s emphasis on functional unity with 
Geoffroy’s universal body plan, to Darwin’s reinterpretation of abstract archetypes as 
causally efficacious ancestors. The message of this history is that “[t]he concepts used 
within comparative biology and the activities of natural kinding have a history of being 
revised and retuned in response to comparative research practices” (118). 
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While Kendig highlights some underappreciated features of phenotype change 
over time, her privileging of multidimensional homology thinking over cladistic 
																																																																		
1 The quote that supports this point—Donoghue’s claim that “partial homology is 
incompatible with standard evolutionary views” (1992, 172)—seems to be taken out of 
context. He is referring to standard views of homology, not evolutionary theory in 
general. 
            
             
             
           
        
            
          
              
           
          
            
             
            
        
            
      
Thusfar, Kendig seems poised to championapluralist accountof homology
concepts. In her accountof thetwentieth century, however, she switches gears to 
championaparticular notionof homology. Sheopposes thecladistic practiceof mapping
homology onto monophyletic groupswithoutacknowledging its particular aim, namely 
to provide reliable classifications and historical hypotheses (113). Ò Homologizing as
monophyleticizingÓ is an Ò all-or-nothingÓ approach that ignores all traits which arenot
inherited throughacontinuousancestral lineageand Ò vociferouslyÓ objects to partial
homologyas a Ò threat to theModern SynthesisÓ (115).1 Against this foil , Kendig claims
that Ò practices of kinding in comparativebiologyare reshaping theconception(s) of
homologyÓ (117).Thesepractices, drawn fromdevelopmental andorganismal biology, 
reveal phenotypic traits to be Ò mosaicÓ composites of modular units that can be
rearranged in acombinatorial fashionduringevolution.Kendig also takes symbiosis to be
asourceof variation that transcendsindividual genetic inheritance. Sheconcludes by
arguing that Ò multidimensional homology thinkingÓ has replaced standard evolutionary
accounts, presumably in much thesameway that Ò [t]hehistorical notionof DarwinÕ s
Ô ancient progenitor Õ replaces OwenÕ s idealist Ô archetypeÕÓ (113).
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approaches is not sufficiently motivated, and she fails to consider alternative traditions 
that may be more congenial to her view. For example, Wake (1999) readily admits the 
existence of partial homology, and Brian Hall (2003) proposes a continuum between 
homology and homoplasy defined by the differential conservation of developmental 
resources and phenotypic traits (see section 4 below for more on his view). 
 
3. Must Homology and Homoplasy Be Kept Apart? 
Adrian Currie (2014) also uses scientific practice to motivate a restriction on homology 
concepts, but with opposite results to Kendig. Whereas she rejects the cladists’ sharp 
separation of homology from homoplasy (roughly, biological similarity without whatever 
kind of correspondence is considered necessary for homology), Currie embraces this 
distinction as necessary to make sense of practice. His methodology also appears more 
promising. While Kendig is selective in her assessment of contemporary homologizing, 
Currie claims to have identified four epistemic roles that are ubiquitous in biology and for 
which a sharp distinction between homology and homoplasy is essential.  
Across these diverse situations, argues Currie, biologists use the distinction 
between homology and homoplasy when distinguishing signal from noise, or “splitting 
evidential wheat from chaff” (704). Which one is which may depend on the situation, but 
the need for a strict distinction remains. For Currie, the distinction must have a 
genealogical foundation2; “two similar traits [in different lineages] are homologous just 
																																																																		
2 Currie uses the term “taxic” interchangeably with “genealogical” and 
“phylogenetic.” See section 6 for an argument that this is misleading. 
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in case they are present in the most recent common ancestor; homoplastic just in case 
they are not present in the common ancestor.” By contrast, a developmental approach to 
homology would identify traits as homologous “just in case they are the products of the 
same developmental process” (702).3 Currie allows that there may be some traits which 
are neither homologous nor homoplastic, but there must not be any overlap—no trait can 
be both homologous and homoplastic.  
In this section, I will briefly review these roles and the particular biological case 
that illustrates them. I accept that Currie has identified an epistemically important 
distinction, but dispute that it concerns homology and homoplasy. To reinforce the point, 
the following section looks more closely at how the relationship between development 
and genealogy is construed by Brian Hall, the main foil for Currie’s account, and Günter 
Wagner, champion of the most worked-out developmental theory of homology.  
																																																																		
3 Proponents of such accounts might object to this definition, which overstates the 
developmental similarity required for homology. 
            
             
              
           
           
          
            
              
First, Currieclaims that thedistinction is essential for determiningphylogenetic
relationsin thefirst place. Similarity of morphological or molecular features is essential
to infer these relationshipsbutbiologists have longrecognized that notall similarities are
equally informative. For example, distinct but related lineages may retain enough
commondevelopmental andgenetic heritagethat they respondto selection in similar
ways. Systematists disagreeas to whether thesemisleadingcharacters (identified as
homoplastic) can sometimes be recognized in advance of cladistic analysis (and thus 
excluded from consideration)or whether they can only berevealed by thetopologyof a
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completed tree. Currie mentions both possibilities without clearly distinguishing them. 
He first identifies “diagnoses of homology and homoplasy” as the result of “statistical 
analysis of patterns of similarity” (710) and later describes them as different kinds of 
input — “homologies count as data-points for common ancestry, while homoplasy is 
noise” (711). Both are obviously phylogenetic applications of the distinction between 
homology and homoplasy, and in either case Currie could argue that allowing overlap 
between these categories would confound their epistemic roles. 
Second, according to Currie, biologists need the distinction when they use 
analogical reasoning to infer the traits of inaccessible organisms from those that are better 
characterized. Extinction is one cause of inaccessibility; others include extreme habitats, 
practical constraints, and ethical concerns. In all these cases, some features can still be 
known but others remain beyond reach. Unobserved traits are often attributed to the 
(inaccessible) target lineage by appealing to a (better known) model lineage that exhibits 
the trait of interest alongside other some other characteristic(s) known to be shared by 
both lineages. What justifies the projection from the coupling of traits in one lineage to 
their coupling in another lineage? According to Currie, homologous and homoplastic 
relationships answer this question differently and thus must be kept apart.  
If the trait were present and coupled in the common ancestor of the model and 
target, then the inference is justified by an appeal to the stability of inheritance. If the trait 
was not present in the common ancestor, we have to appeal to a different kind of 
regularity, one grounded in the similarity of selective regimes. In both cases, there are 
additional factors to consider. We may be cautious about inferring the continuous 
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inheritance of traits that are especially labile or between lineages that are especially 
distant. Likewise, strong selection in related lineages may increase the probability of 
parallel evolution. Not all cases of homology and homoplasy can ground the inference, 
but both provide important evidence for such an inference. The evidence, however, is of 
fundamentally different types, and so we should keep these two concepts distinct.  
A third reason to maintain the distinction is that it aids in testing adaptive 
hypotheses. The independent appearance of some trait in two lineages — an example of 
parallel evolution, which Currie classifies as homoplasy — can furnish evidence of 
adaptive function, particular when the environments are similar. But if the trait was not 
independently acquired, any adaptive hypothesis must first consider the ancestral 
environment and the original function of the trait.  
Finally, Currie argues that evolutionary developmental biology, with its interest in 
evolutionary novelties, needs at least a derivative form of the delineated genealogical 
account. Under one definition, a novel trait is just one that has no homologue in any 
ancestral taxon. This is certainly a phylogenetic definition, but it does not require any 
particular contrast with homoplasy. The concept of novelty is itself rather vexed 
(Brigandt 2012) so this example provides perhaps the weakest support for Currie’s claim. 
Currie illustrates the example by referring to the dispute over a remarkable 
hypothesis that the birdlike dinosaur Sinornithosaurus was venomous. Gong et al. (2010, 
2011) advance this hypothesis on the basis of particular morphological traits and 
analogies with extant venomous taxa. Gianechini et al. (2011) dispute their interpretation 
of both the anatomical and the phylogenetic evidence. According to Currie, 
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understanding this exchange requires “requires contrasting homoplasy and homology 
along taxic lines—to make sense of the dispute we need the distinction” (707). Without 
going into details of the dispute, I will present four questions that exemplify Currie’s four 
epistemic roles for the distinction between homology and homoplasy.  
1) What is the relationship between the theropod clade to which Sinornithosaurus 
belongs and other major dinosaur clades? 2) Was Sinornithosaurus venomous? 3) Are 
Sinornithosaurus fangs an adaptation to deliver venom to feathered prey or were they 
selected for some other function (or not directly selected at all)? 4) At what point did 
venom first evolve in the lineage leading to Sinornithosaurus — in other words, when 
and how did the evolutionary novelty arise?  
 
 
  
 
 
 In order to answer all four questions, biologists must know something about how 
venom and its anatomical correlates are distributed on the phylogenetic tree leading to
Sinornithosaurus.1) In reconstructing Sinornithosaurus ancestry, some morphological 
traits will  be better indicators than others.Likewise, a solid tree will  constrain our 
hypotheses about the evolution of traits like venom. 2) The analogy between the coupling 
of morphological traits in venomous lizards and snakes and their alleged coupling in 
Sinornithosaurus will  be justified differently depending on whether or not the traits were 
present in a common ancestor. 3) If  venom was present in the common ancestor of 
Sinornithosaurus and extant venomous taxa, we need to consider its adaptation to the 
ancestral environment. If  it is a parallel evolution, we can more confidently analogize the 
ecological functions of venom. 4) Identifying the evolutionary novelty depends on which 
precursor traits the ancestor possessed.
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4. Developmental Perspectives on Phylogeny 
Brian Hall, one of the founding figures of evolutionary developmental biology, has 
insisted that homology and homoplasy should be understood as elements of a continuum. 
Does this view stand in tension with Currie’s emphasis on phylogenetic clarification of 
ancestral relations? I argue that it does not. While Hall does indeed give developmental 
mechanisms a role in assessing homology, he remains adamant that they are insufficient 
for this purpose. In fact, questions about their significance for homology “are best 
posed—perhaps can only be posed—within the context of a sound phylogenetic analysis. 
Questions of mechanisms are second to phylogeny when assessing homology or 
homoplasy” (2007b, 476). The secondary place of development mechanisms reflects their 
complicated relationship with phenotypic evolution. Development can diverge even as a 
phenotypic trait is continuously inherited, and the phenotypic output of a conserved 
developmental mechanism can change over time.  
“The history of life has been descent with modification” (Hall 2003, 427). For 
Hall, this unitary process underwrites a continuum between homology and a collection of 
relationships traditionally grouped under the heading of homoplasy.  
Whether we are examining homoplasy (convergence), parallelism, reversals, 
 Currie thus clearly illustrates that different phylogenetic patterns allow different 
kinds of inference, but it is not necessary to cash out these distinctions in terms of the 
contrast between homology andhomoplasy. To reinforce this point, I turn to 
proponents of a developmental account.
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rudiments, vestiges, atavisms or homology, we are dealing with common descent 
with varying degrees of modification of features as a result of natural selection 
tinkering with the genetic and developmental bases responsible for producing 
those features (ibid). 
This passage reflects Hall’s argument that only convergence—the evolution of 
similar traits in independent lineages—should be understood as truly homoplastic. 
However, he recognizes that independence cannot be precisely defined since all taxa 
share an evolutionary history that in many cases leads to conservation of genetic and 
developmental processes across great phylogenetic distances (2007a, 437–8). 
The main difference between Hall and Currie, then, is simply that Hall recognizes 
parallel evolution as a type of homology because it depends on shared developmental 
resources. He still distinguishes this category from traditional homology, in which the 
trait itself is conserved along the ancestral lineage. Why does the distinction matter, in his 
view? Without emphasizing the affinity between homology and the other phenomena, he 
worries, we will be inclined to “search for different developmental and genetical 
mechanisms” and thus neglect the implications of shared evolutionary history. (2007b, 
442). Rather than neglecting the importance of common ancestry, Hall places it at the 
base of his developmental account.  
Hall’s respect for genealogical approaches to homology led the systematist Joel 
Cracraft (2005) to count him as a “phylogenist” in his critique of evo-devo approaches to 
homology. The case of Günter Wagner, the originator and current champion of a 
developmental approach, therefore provides an instructive contrast. Wagner’s original 
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articulation of the “biological homology concept” (BHC) made no mention of phylogeny 
and emphasized only shared developmental constraints (MacLeod 2011). But Wagner 
(1999) explicitly recognizes the importance of phylogeny in constraining mechanistic 
investigation. The initial steps in his early proposal for testing the BHC depend on 
phylogenetic analysis — putative homologues should be identified within two different 
but related taxonomic groups, and their distribution mapped onto a phylogenetic tree, 
ideally one constructed independently with molecular data. His recent (2014) book-length 
development of this approach is replete with phylogenetic trees and full of references to 
phylogenetic distributions that constraint the set of mechanistic hypothesis for the 
individuation and evolution of characters. 
This sketch of Hall and Wagner gives us no reason to doubt that they would 
accept each of Currie’s epistemic functions. They could maintain their differing views of 
homology by arguing that these examples, while sometimes framed in terms of 
homology, do not exhaust the meaning of the term. 
 
5. Compatibilist Solutions 
Given the failure of these two attempts to mount a practice-based restriction on 
homology, we might consider other approaches that emphasize the compatibility of 
different concepts.  
Griffiths (2007) rejects the assumption “that principles of classification that can 
unify diverse particulars into broad categories…must be derived from our best 
explanatory theories of the domain to be classified” (655). Roughly, competing 
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“definitions” of homology are best understood as complementary explanations for a 
broad set of homology phenomena that are recognizable apart from those definitions. 
Operational criteria for recognizing homology, particularly the relative position of the 
parts and the existence of intermediates between them, have remained relatively constant 
since the nineteenth century. Both the genealogical and developmental approaches offer 
causal explanations of the phenomena of homology, the former in terms of common 
descent and the latter in terms of shared mechanisms. 
Brigandt (2009) also emphasizes the compatibility of the two approaches, which 
“simply address different aspects and temporal stages of one complex phenomenon” (89). 
The unity of this complex phenomenon is provided by the HPC (homeostatic property 
cluster) view of natural kinds. Assertion of a homology relation between body parts in 
different lineages picks them out as members of a kind united by the homeostatic 
mechanisms that determine their individuality as units of phenotypic evolution. These 
mechanisms are in turn genealogically related in patterns that are traced by the methods 
of phylogenetic reconstruction. The developmental approach to homology emphasizes the 
individuating mechanisms, and the genealogical approach emphasizes their evolutionary 
relationships. 
This view depends on a particular theoretical concept of biological characters as 
modular, quasi-independent units individuated by developmental genetic control 
mechanisms. There is good evidence (Wagner 2014) that such mechanisms exist for 
many body parts, and that they can change their component parts while maintaining their 
individuating potential. In such cases the two accounts may indeed be related by the 
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natural kind view. But what happens when the morphological characters proposed as 
homologous are not individuated in this way? Or when the lineages are extinct and the 
mechanisms are inaccessible? In these situations the unity seems likely to break down.  
I am convinced by the argument of MacLeod (2011, 2013) that the natural kind 
picture glosses over importance methodological differences between the two approaches. 
Those characters which are most informative for reconstructing phylogenies will not be 
the most informative for understanding the developmental individuation of parts. A 
systematist, for example, will seek synapomorphic characters that uniquely diagnose all 
the descendants of a common ancestor. A developmental biologist, on the other hand, 
may be more interested in underlying mechanisms that are shared across groups, and thus 
homoplastic by cladistic reckoning. The account of Griffiths (2007) fares better on this 
analysis since it allows biologists to have different explanatory aims, but it does not 
account for the fact that proponents of different theoretical accounts see themselves as 
identifying homology, not merely explaining it. The two phases cannot be separated as 
neatly as Griffiths supposes. 
 
6. Which Conflicts Should We Capture? 
So far I have argued that a set of philosophical responses to conflicts over the meaning of 
homology—differing in their approaches but united in their concern to represent 
practice—fail to capture practice in important ways. The more restrictive accounts either 
simply ignore important epistemic functions (Kendig) or incorrectly assume that other 
important functions constrain empirical and theoretical research more than is actually the 
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case (Currie). The more compatibilist accounts do a better job of accounting for the range 
of approaches to homology, but they still gloss over important methodological 
differences both within and between the two main branches.  
Given the immense diversity of scientific practices, philosophical accounts must 
face the challenge of determining how to individuate those practices. With sufficiently 
careful scrutiny, we might find nearly as many approaches to homology as there are 
individual scientists. Which ones should we try to capture? Recent philosophical work 
uniformly identifies a broad dichotomy between approaches focused on history and 
approaches focused on development. Is this the best way to frame the problem? Like 
earlier dichotomies—reviewed by Roth (1994, 303)—this one maps roughly onto the 
disciplinary divisions between systematists and biologists of other disciplinary 
persuasions. But a closer examination of those earlier dichotomies shows some 
uncertainty in how to count the categories. The original version of taxic homology, for 
example, deliberately broke with the requirement that homologous parts be traceable 
through “transformation series” to parts in common ancestors (Patterson 1982, Donoghue 
1992).  
I suggest we avoid such difficulties entirely by focusing our attention elsewhere, 
on the research practices that undergird the different theoretical accounts of homology 
(however we count them). My analysis of Currie (2014) shows that biologists with 
radically different theoretical accounts of homology might nevertheless agree that 
phylogenetic patterns constrain inferences about ancestral traits and adaptations in 
particular ways. They could likewise agree that not all traits are equally informative for 
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constructing evolutionary trees in the first place. Insofar as they disagree about what 
makes those traits novel, those disagreements do not turn their differing views about 
homology. 
I suggest that we are more likely to find philosophically interesting disagreements 
among biologists who share broad theoretical approaches to homology. The 
paleontologists arguing over Sinornithosaurus venom do not reveal their hand on this 
topic (in fact they never explicitly discuss either homology or homoplasy) but given their 
subject matter, it seems a safe assumption that they will not consider developmental 
genetic individuation of body parts to be necessary for identifying homology. On the 
other hand, they disagree mightily about the interpretation of many empirical details. Are 
the teeth of Sinornithosaurus really as elongated as they appear, or just displaced from 
their sockets? Is one particular cavity in its skull, allegedly specialized to hold a venom 
gland, really anatomically separate from a neighboring cavity? Does the recent discovery 
of venom in new lizard and mammal taxa raise the plausibility of finding venom in 
ancestral dinosaurs? 
To take another example from across the disciplinary aisle, evolutionary 
developmental biologists are currently engaged in a lively debate as to how the five digits 
of ancestral tetrapods gave rise to the three digits found in bird wings. The idea that 
developmental mechanisms delineate evolutionary units is implicit in this debate, so its 
participants are united in taking a broadly developmental approach to homology. The 
experimental evidence has ruled out certain simple scenarios in which the pattern of 
developmental control remained constant even as some digits were lost. However, it has 
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so far been insufficient to determine which of several plausible complex transformations 
have actually occurred (Young et al. 2011, Larsson and Wagner 2012). Some have 
therefore doubted whether digits are really developmentally individuated in the first place 
(Wagner 2014).   
For Wagner, this kind of empirical ferment is a sign of the success of his view of 
homology. “The developmental account makes stronger assumptions about biological 
reality” than other approaches which do not postulate specific mechanisms for the 
maintenance of part individuality “and, thus, leads to testable predictions” (2014, 75). In 
general, he takes a pragmatic notion of homology concepts that prioritizes empirical 
fruitfulness over precise definitions. “Any concept is only as good as the research 
program it inspires” (245). 
 
 
 
I want to get on with it and to leave behind debates that started when biologists 
really did not have sufficient biological knowledge to appreciate the causes of 
biological similarity and when they did not yet understand that Darwin was right 
 This sentiment is reflected by biologists from other perspectives. Though 
Donoghue (1992) worried that early versions of WagnerÕ s program were overly narrow, 
he pointed out that Ò[ a]chieving consistency with every version of homology may yield a 
definition that is of little use to anyone (179). De Pinna (1991, 368) argues that Ò an 
evaluation of definitions of homology acquires sense only against a specif ic frame of
referenceÓ  defined by Òa  more encompassing method or theory,Ó  so that definitional 
disputes only have meaning against the backdrop of certain common assumptions. David 
Wake puts the point most strongly, in a paper arguing that the homology debate is a
Òdistra ctionÓ  from real research questions.
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in his view that there is one genealogy for all of life (1999, 45). 
 
7. Conclusions 
What would it mean for philosophers to follow Wake’s lead and get on with it—to move 
past attempts to adjudicate or supersede debates about the meaning of homology? 
Various compatibilist approaches have taken a step towards this aim by characterizing the 
ways in which different theoretical accounts of homology are useful for different 
purposes (e.g. Brigandt 2003, 2012). We still need much more careful attention to the 
types of arguments that homology concepts, in their various forms, make possible, and 
we need to move away from the assumption that conflict between approaches is 
something to be explained away. This conflict is a natural consequence of the complexity 
of the phenomena under study and mirrors the disciplinary specialization necessary for 
propagating empirically successful techniques.  
I am not saying, however, that we should simply defer to scientists when giving 
account of homology. Though metaphysical or definitional unification has brought only 
limited success, philosophical work has only scratched the possibilities for identifying 
some kind of epistemic commonality among the various homology practices. Several 
authors (Griffiths 2007; MacLeod 2011, 2013) have emphasized the role that homology 
plays in creating meaningful categories that can be subsequently used for inductive 
generalizations (for example from mouse to human physiology). This is one important 
function, but we should also consider the ways in which homology facilitates contrastive 
reasoning—the identification of meaningful differences between comparable individuals 
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(organisms, body parts, gene networks, etc.)—and the underlying causes of those 
differences. This would be a worthy application of the growing enthusiasm for practice-
centered philosophy of science. 
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